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More Neoliberal Art History 
By Todd Cronan (Emory University) and Charles Palermo (College of 
William & Mary) 
This discussion addresses two parts of Pamela M. Lee’s forthcoming study of Think Tank Aesthetics: 
Mid-Century Modernism, The Cold War and the Rise of Visual Culture: the 2011 October essay 
“Aesthetic Strategist: Albert Wohlstetter, the Cold War, and a Theory of Mid-Century Modernism,” and a 
recent talk, “1973: or, the Arché of Neoliberalism.”1Two core issues are at stake throughout Lee’s study, 
the crisis of the humanities and its connections with neoliberal policy.2  In “Aesthetic Strategist” Lee 
focuses on the surprising relationship between military strategist and systems theorist Wohlstetter and art 
historian Meyer Schapiro, who shared a defining commitment to semiotics; in “1973” Lee looks at the 
Ulm designer Gui Bonsiepe, the management systems expert Stafford Beer, and the Austrian economist 
Friedrich Hayek to consider the way their work occupies and evacuates history. 
Wohlstetter is best known for his 1959 RAND Corporation discussion of “The Delicate Balance of 
Terror.”3 As Lee shows, Wohlstetter’s argument in this and related works turned on the problem of 
intentionality. Wohlstetter’s basic aim was to dispel what he called “the nearly universal optimism about 
the stability of deterrence” (215). As it was conventionally understood, deterrence was a matter of assured 
mutual destruction. Wohlstetter was unconvinced. Projecting innumerable “uncertainties” into the 
equation, above all the increased probability of “accidents” with the rise of multiplied weaponry, 
Wohlstetter sought to come to terms with uncertainty and accident rather than wish them away. Appealing 
in part to Schapiro’s semiotics, but more significantly to Claude Shannon’s information theory, 
Wohlstetter sought to reduce the “noise to signal” ratio in reading enemy dispatches. If ambiguity haunted 
every message, what strategies were available to reduce them? Seeking in vain for “unambiguous 
evidence of enemy intentions,” he warned of “miscalculations” when construing “enemy intent and the 
meaning of ambiguous signals” (226, 231). If intentional analysis was difficult with works of art, then 
“Not even the most advanced reconnaissance equipment can disclose an intention from 40,000 feet” 
(231). For Wohlstetter, and for the most obvious reasons, intention was something one aimed to 
“disclose.” (We might pause at this point to note how Lee is asking readers to transfer Wohlstetter’s 
extreme vision of message extraction to an understanding of how the humanities deals with intent.) In 
order to “reduce the chance of accident” Wohlstetter sought a kind of absolute intentionality, a set of 
“‘fail-safe’ procedures” to extract a meaning from the ambiguous message. As his procedures developed, 
Wohlstetter began to see that potentially nothing was outside the constraints of systems analysis. In the 
most revealing moment of Lee’s discussion, she cites Wohlstetter’s 1979 “Notes on Signals Hidden in 
Noise”: “No signal, in the sense in which it is used in…information theory is ever completely 
ambiguous….[N]o bit of noise is unambiguously noise; it is always possible to hypothesize that some 
apparently random series of events contains a piece of information, deliberately, or actually 
concealed.”4 So what began as intensified sense of ambiguity and uncertainty ends as fail-safe and the 
totalization of meaning. As Lee concludes her discussion of “Aesthetic Strategist,” Wolhstetter 
marshalled Schapiro’s “polysemic” semiotics to “agendas that were far more universalizing, or perhaps 
colonizing: to read, and thus control, an expanding empire of signs.” 
Neoliberalism, then, is the mastery of signs. Thus, for Lee, neoliberalism hinges on matters like the 
“convergence between semiotics and politics,” on the “demands of operational analysis,” the “military-
aesthetic complex,” on systems and algorithms, even more generally on notions of domination, 
administration, and control by and through signs. And while it makes perfect sense to see a defense 
strategist committed to reducing the presence of “polysemic” signs, for Lee, the opposite holds as well. 
Polysemousness is the critical tool for undermining neoliberalism, a kind of permanent, and potentially 
disruptive, noise in the system. 
 In “1973: or, The Arché of Neoliberalism,” Lee takes up a seemingly related dimension of Cold War 
thought and its connection to events in the past and to contemporary artistic production. She considers an 
enigmatic recent installation, Multinode Metagame, at the Zentrum für Kunst und Medientechnologie, 
which is based on the décor and technology of an even more curious project, the Opsroom of CyberSyn, 
which was a project of Salvador Allende, the ill-fated socialist leader of Chile in the early ’seventies who 
was deposed and murdered by Augusto Pinochet in a coup September 11, 1973. CyberSyn was to use the 
latest thinking in management systems to coordinate, in the Opsroom, daily reports from Chile’s factories 
and plants of all kinds. This aggregate of nearly real-time economic information would inform a team of 
planners seated in the Opsroom in high-tech swivel chairs and surrounded by screens onto which 
representations of this data could be projected. There, information could be fashioned into a centralized 
response to changing conditions. 
 The Opsroom was never fully operational. And Allende’s planned economy never had a chance. But it 
brought together a management systems expert, Stafford Beer, and a design specialist, Gui Bonsiepe, 
whose perspectives on the intersection of design and systems Lee takes to capture a crucial nodal point in 
history. Lee draws on a third voice, Austrian economist Friedrich Hayek, to exemplify mid-century 
thinking around systems. Hayek played a leading role in the Mont Pelerin Society, and he also knew Beer 
(however fleetingly) and visited Pinochet’s Chile twice. Hayek, like Wohlstetter, represents a crucial 
interdisciplinary perspective. Hayek places economics in a network of disciplines with the stated aim of 
securing maximal individual liberty in a society that permits everyone the freedom to pursue his or her 
own interests to his or her own advantage. While all of these figures profess a concern with liberty and 
equity in society, they are all concerned, more centrally, about the concentration of control. 
What they forget—or suppress—is history. According to Lee, the Mont Pelerin Society aimed to suppress 
certain historical accounts and to fill their place in our understanding of the world with an 
interdisciplinary program that excluded history—an aim fulfilled in our neoliberal society, insofar as it 
lies past what Francis Fukuyama called the end of history. It is there, in the return to CyberSyn’s 
Opsroom, that Lee sees a return to a moment before the official account could regard Allende’s failure as 
a fait accompli, a return to the floor of the desert where bodies continue to emerge, a return to the 
primordial matrix, the arché, of neoliberalism. But what kind of history is this? 
It’s a vision of neoliberalism’s historical moment that avoids—is designed to avoid—the role that class 
conflict and exploitation plays in this history. Lee notes how the designers at Ulm “read deeply in 
Frankfurt School Marxism” and how Bonsiepe’s Marxism converged with (loosely) neoliberal system-
thinking in the Opsroom. Unless Bonsiepe was a terrible reader of the Frankfurt School, it is clearly an 
extension of the (highly contested) model of Marxism that Adorno and Horkheimer developed 
with Dialectic of Enlightenment—one that, like Bonsiepe’s, and like Lee’s, expunges exploitation from 
the record in the name of mechanisms like administration, domination and violence.5 That is why one 
(maybe Bonsiepe) could perhaps understand Lee’s disregard or minimizing the ideological opposition 
between Allende’s communism and Pinochet’s fascism, both of which were (on this account) 
epiphenomenal expressions of the primacy of administrative systems. And if systems are what matter to 
neoliberalism, then something like anti-system, “polysemic” difference would be its “enemy,” not 
redistribution. 
When the enemy is the state, anti-statism is the alternative. Thus the “recursive” part of Lee’s 
Foucauldian “recursive ontology” (her alternative to neoliberalism) is an ongoing and collapsible 
collectivity without a state. As Daniel Zamora and Michael C. Behrent have recently shown, in Foucault 
and Neoliberalism, there is wide common ground between Left and Right anti-statists.6 In Mitchell 
Dean’s words, Foucault looked into the “liberal and neoliberal political repertoire to find ways of 
renovating social-democratic or socialist politics and escaping its perceived fatal statism.”7 But this 
“recursive ontology” is a system, too—just a system without a center, without an author. 
 In Lee’s work, systems have a way of generating “meaning” independent of agents. This commitment to 
autonomous systems should be familiar to readers of Lee’s earlier work, Chronophobia: On Time in the 
Art of the 1960’s (2004). Recall that Lee asked readers to “feel” Riley’s paintings, to “experience” them, 
rather than view them as abstractions. Readers were asked to “Stand a little longer, look a little harder” 
at Current of 1964 and consider “what happens” while you look (155). Looking a little longer and harder 
the surface flickers “like a stroboscope; or wave, like a lenticular screen; look longer still and surprising 
colors-psychedelic phantoms-emerge from between the lines. Spangles of gold, pink, and green burst and 
flash, lining the eyelids and rattling the skull. The eye is ennervated while the body feels something else: 
nausea, perhaps, or even a blinding headache” (155). Woozy, rattled, enervated, nauseous, blind.8 One 
might be tempted to show how this account is a highly literal instance of Bois’ notion of the 
“surefire.”9 But Bois tends to see surefire works as intended, even if they fundamentally displace the 
relevance of any intent. When Lee asks “what happens to you” before a Riley, she’s not asking what the 
artist meant to happen to you. It’s “Not…a matter of intention…on the artist’s part—far from it” (235). 
Bois’ critical ophthalmology becomes Lee’s ophthalmology without an operator.10 Operatorless 
ophthalmology does not (yet) make an appearance in Think-Tank Aesthetics: the agency of line in Riley is 
replaced by the agency of systems and inevitable noise they make when the body gets processed in its 
cogs. 
So what kind of history is this? How does Lee describe the moment of historical contingency in 1973 
when CyberSyn threatened to function as a tool of a planned economy, as the vehicle for an economy 
outside or beyond the market? Why is it difficult for us, in our historical moment to grasp that contingent 
moment and imagine in it something else? Why is it difficult to imagine an alternative form of social 
organization, one that we could will for ourselves and others? 
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The point of Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis is, of course, not that history as memorable 
events ended, but that history (understood as the narrative of evolving and competing forms of economic 
and political organization, as ideological disagreements) ended. People would still do things—seek 
advantages, prosecute wars, seek justice for past wrongs—but they would do them within a capitalist 
market economy: 
And yet, good news has come. The most remarkable development of the last quarter of the twentieth 
century has been the revelation of enormous weaknesses at the core of the world’s seemingly strong 
dictatorships, whether they be of the military-authoritarian Right, or the communist-totalitarian Left. 
From Latin America to Eastern Europe, from the Soviet Union to the Middle East and Asia, strong 
governments have been failing over the last two decades. And while they have not given way in all cases 
to stable liberal democracies, liberal democracy remains the only coherent political aspiration that spans 
different regions and cultures around the globe. In addition, liberal principles in economics—the “free 
market”—have spread, and have succeeded in producing unprecedented levels of material prosperity, 
both in industrially developed countries and in countries that had been, at the close of World War II, part 
of the impoverished Third World. A liberal revolution in economic thinking has sometimes preceded, 
sometimes followed, the move toward political freedom around the globe.11 
The tone of self-evidence—the kind that saturates Lee’s stories of mostly forgotten anti-heroes—is 
standard for the genre. Whatever the quarter-century of failures has thrown at it, act as though it’s some 
hard knocks on the way to success.12 The author’s present doubts are about the durability of the neoliberal 
free-market order’s best, most democratic form, not the possibility that competing social or economic 
organizations might reenter the ring and prove themselves superior to neoliberalism. 
That is neoliberal ideology. Lee tells us that neoliberalism’s architects busied themselves with writing 
certain kinds of histories out of the record. This has everything to do with underplaying ideological 
differences and alternatives. So, for instance, when Friedrich Hayek wrote The Road to Serfdom, history 
(in Fukuyama’s sense) was anything but over. Still, there seemed to Hayek to be remarkably little, even 
then, to disagree about in the struggle between liberals (in Hayek’s sense) and “planners” (socialists—
National, Soviet, and otherwise): 
The dispute between the modern planners and their opponents is, therefore, nota dispute on whether we 
ought to choose intelligently between the various possible organizations of society; it is not a dispute on 
whether we ought to employ foresight and systematic thinking in planning our common affairs. It is a 
dispute about what is the best way of so doing. The question is whether for this purpose it is better that 
the holder of coercive power should confine himself in general to creating conditions under which the 
knowledge and initiative of individuals are given the best scope so that they can plan most successfully; 
or whether a rational utilization of our resources requires central direction and organization of all our 
activities according to some consciously constructed “blueprint.”13 
Hayek allowed room for the state—to ensure that everyone had equal access to trades, to regulate 
methods of production (for safety, etc.), to administer “an extensive system of social services,” etc. (37). 
As long as the state’s intervention did not coerce, did not interfere with competition, and did not apply 
unequally to different parties (as long, that is, as the rule of law was enforced on everyone), Hayek did not 
object. 
The idea of rule of law is central to The Road to Serfdom. 
The distinction we have drawn before between the creation of a permanent framework of laws within 
which the productive activity is guided by individual decisions and the direction of economic activity by a 
central authority is thus really a particular case of the more general distinction between the Rule of Law 
and arbitrary government. Under the first the government confines itself to fixing rules determining the 
conditions under which the available resources may be used, leaving to the individuals the decision for 
what ends they are to be used. Under the second the government directs the use of the means of 
production to particular ends. The first type of rules can be made in advance, in the shape of formal 
rules which do not aim at the wants and needs of particular people. They are intended to be merely 
instrumental in the pursuit of people’s various individual ends. (73) 
As long as laws regulating economic activity avoided directing resources to “particular ends,” they were 
agreeable to Hayek’s theory. 
So even for Hayek, stuck in the thick of history, there wasn’t that much to disagree about. The crux of the 
disagreement, according to him, would be something like CyberSyn. Indeed, a quote from Lee suggests 
that Beer’s view of management was deeply that of one of Hayek’s “planners”: “When we come to 
management, whether of the firm or of the country or of international affairs, the same problem of 
adaptation exists.”14 And yet, Hayek and Beer traveled in the same circles, due to their shared interest in 
systems theory. In fact, though, their views didn’t diverge so sharply: 
Every manager, whether he runs the family business or a small department in a firm, whether he runs the 
firm itself or a major department of Government, whether he runs the country or an aspect of international 
affairs, faces an identical problem. He faces, that is, the need to maintain a viable system far more 
complicated than he personally can understand. And the beginning of wisdom for management at any 
level is the realisation that viable systems are, in large measure, self-regulating and even self-organising.15 
Does that mean, then, that even in Allende’s CyberSyn, neoliberalism’s devotion to self-organizing 
markets was fundamental? Is the coordination of information—the communications systems that were 
really a form of domination and for which design, selonGui Bonsiepe, was merely camouflage—the 
historical soil in which today’s full-blown neoliberalism germinated? 
If you accept accounts like Hayek’s and Beer’s of the coordination and functioning of markets, then 
possibly the answer is yes. But what about Pinochet? No light-touch regulator there. So what are we to 
make of Hayek’s visits to Pinochet’s Chile? Or, more to the point, what does Hayek’s theorizing have to 
do with anything, really? Richard Raico, writing on the Cato Institute’s letterhead, warns Hayek that visits 
openly condoning Pinochet’s regime might pose a danger to his reputation and to public perception of the 
libertarian/neoliberal program. This assumes, I suppose, that we accept at face value Hayek’s insistence—
repeated throughout The Road to Serfdom, in the Mont Pelerin Society’s “Statement of Aims,” and 
beyond—that the moral foundation of his social thinking was an aversion to the kind of coercion that 
Pinochet was known to favor. 
If we concede that all the moral handwringing—indeed, the whole theoretical foundation of neoliberalism 
in individual liberty and rule of law—is a transparent excuse for exploitation, then systems theory stops 
looking central to anything much at all. On many levels, this seems the right thing to do. Richard Nixon’s 
CIA was there on September 11, 1973, as it was on so many occasions, supporting the thuggish strong-
man whose extinction Fukuyama celebrated in 1992 as the crowning achievement of those very same 
Cold Warriors. And the Cato Institute’s commitment to a principled libertarianism hardly sets it above an 
odious piece of transparently illogical special pleading when it is trying to save a special carve-out in the 
rule of law for its kind of people. We recommend Daniel J. Mitchell’s “Debunking Fiscal Myths: There Is 
No Loophole for ‘Carried Interest.’”16 (It’s a mixture of arguments for incentivizing certain economic 
behaviors—anathema to Hayek—and cooked descriptions of real-world activities: “A capital gain doesn’t 
magically become labor income just because an investor decides to share a portion of the gain with a fund 
manager.” Sharing is supposed to replace paying fees, so that the fund manager’s pay can look like some 
kind of act of largesse.) 
One has to agree with Bonsiepe, then. The aesthetics of CyberSyn and the whole style-apparatus of the 
Hochschule für Gestaltung have been the sugar that helped the medicine—exploitation—go down. And 
while this could certainly be attractive to an art historian—it makes it seem like we’re in the thick of 
ideological struggles—studying the sugar won’t tell you anything relevant about how the medicine—
neoliberalism—works. If The Road to Serfdom or mid-century design Kitsch sold you neoliberalism by 
promising you a glowing utopia, equal treatment under the rule of law, and freedom from coercion, 
rereading Hayek or Bonsiepe more critically won’t help you understand why your hedge-fund manager 
pays half your tax rate, or why your loved ones disappeared into the desert. 
A final point: we might hesitate to describe the CyberSyn’s décor as modernist. The chairs suggest 
Saarinen, but is the Opsroom animated by a modernist sensibility? To the extent that the heart of the 
project is to produce a maximally flexible situation that projects for the participating subject a kind of 
immersion in an array of information, to be reconfigured for and by the experiencing subject, it is 
paradigmatic of a post-minimalist sensibility. Why does this matter? 
To return to Bonsiepe’s insight: aesthetics does not hover above the world of politics, and his design 
aesthetic “was necessarily imbricated in a network bent on systems of either emancipation or control” 
(“1973”). Now, since it was the project of a socialist government, Hayek would say it supported a system 
of control; we socialists would see it as a tool of emancipation. Bonsiepe may have worried that, despite 
Allende’s plans for it, it might have had domination in its DNA. It was a matter that worried Beer and 
Chilean workers, as well.17 Insofar as it is a question of the real ability of the CyberSyn room to capture 
and represent the Chilean economy, domination seems to have been well beyond its potential grasp 
(“Democratic Socialism, Cybernetic Socialism,” 719). Insofar as the question is an empirical one, 
Pinochet put the answer out of reach in 1973. 
The more interesting question, then, would be about Enrique Rivera and Catalina Ossa’s Multinode 
Metagame (2002) and the Opsroom reconstruction at ZKM (2005), which featured Bonsiepe’s 
photograph of the Opsroom portion of CyberSyn, a computer game by Felix S. Huber, and a DVD 
showing Patricio Guzmán’s La batalla de Chile (three parts, 1975, 1976, and 1979). The photograph is 
enlarged and mounted horizontally to provide seating. What these projects share, beside their orientation 
toward CyberSyn (or the faded Ektachrome avant-garde romance of it) and the tragedy of Allende’s 
regime, is their commitment to an open-ended, participatory user interface, so to speak. That is, both of 
them emphatically reject the self-contained modernist work, which is a set of fixed internal relations 
indifferent to the presence of a beholder, in favor of a paradigmatically anti-modernist open-ended 
situation of which user participation is constitutive.18 What does this refusal of modernist art in favor of 
anti- or postmodernist experience have to do with neoliberalism? Everything.19 
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At the end of “1973: or, the Arché of Neoliberalism,” Lee describes an isomorphism that relates the 
astronomy that makes the Chilean desert so valuable to science, on one hand, to history, on the other, and 
specifically to the history of the Pinochet regime. A woman, Violeta Berríos, who lost a loved one to 
Pinochet’s thugs tells Guzmán in 2010 that she wishes the telescopes could turn their gaze downward and, 
rather than collecting light emitted by stars millions of years ago, expose the remains of those who were 
deposited there in modern human history. This is part of the history Multinode Metagame offers the user 
in Germany, courtesy of the Chilean archive. Like a telescope, it, too, offers a remote glimpse into events 
of long ago. The information in the archive is available for the user—who sits in a recreation of the 
CyberSyn Opsroom’s chairs—to consult and arrange. One can join Berríos, sympathetically, in mourning 
the dead and deploring the brutal regime of the dictator. 
But brutality is not unique to neoliberalism. And sympathy for its victims makes an ideological struggle 
into what Brecht called empathy, a central means to dissimulate the source of the violence. This is the 
failure of projects like Multinode Metagame as politics. They are not about challenging neoliberalism, 
they are about feeling-management, arousal and dispersal. Lee’s conclusion on this point is telling. Like 
her analysis of Bridget Riley, it shows you how you are affected by design, not how neoliberalism 
functions. “Individual memory and collective history mirror one another as traumatic isomorphs” 
(“1973”). It’s easy to see the individual memory; the collective history appears here not as the economic 
and political structures that produce exploitation and repression, but as something like a starry sky—a 
thousand points of light, traumatized and individual. This is how things look under the end-of-history 
lens—without an analysis of exploitation, it’s individuals looking for justice for individual injuries or 
sharing a portion of the gain: within a neoliberal market economy. 
That individual experience is what is at stake in an analysis like Lee’s and in projects like the Multinode 
Metagame and the Opsroom installation means that they are always different, always changing, always 
occasioning new “meanings.” This is the polysemic, and the polysemic is not the opposition, but the alibi 
of neoliberalism. It provides cover for exploitation, the glitter of a thousand stars to transfix the thousands 
of victims while their pockets are being picked. Much easier is to transfix the eyes of the elite on the 
intersection of art and government, on the glamour of old systems, because they know that if they look 
there long enough, they might begin to believe they are the critics and not packaging for the perpetrators. 
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